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1. Introduction 
The Coalition government came to power in 2010 in the wake of a financial crisis that had exposed 
significant weaknesses in UK’s financial regulatory structure. The new government’s early attempts 
to repair these weaknesses had two elements: to the extent the financial crisis was seen as a 
banking crisis, it set up an Independent Commission for Banking (ICB) to identify the fault-lines.  But 
it also launched an overhaul of the institutional architecture of financial regulation in the UK, leading 
to the Financial Services Act 2012. This note assesses the Coalition’s record and achievements in the 
area of financial regulation. 
While the financial crisis focused attention on the failures and near-failures of some of UK’s largest 
retail banks, to a large extent the underlying problems had emerged from the so-called shadow 
banking sector. This sector comprises a variety of non-deposit-taking financial institutions which 
engage in maturity transformation like retail banks but lack any protection for their creditors. 
Without protection, this sector is particularly vulnerable to wholesale ‘runs’, if short-term lenders 
decide en masse not to roll over their debt or demand large ‘haircuts’ to do so. In the recent crisis, 
problems arose initially in markets for securities backed by subprime mortgages, but metastasised 
into a broader crisis of illiquidity, and eventually came to stress the balance sheets of retail banks.  
Once market turmoil sets in, any fragility of financial intermediaries is vulnerable to endogenous 
amplification mechanisms. A bank that wants to repair its stressed balance sheet may choose to 
deleverage by selling some of its assets. While optimal from the standpoint of a single bank, when 
many financial institutions make similar adjustments simultaneously, asset prices fall; this triggers 
further adjustment of leverage by additional sale of assets. This “fire-sale externality” may be 
exacerbated by a “haircut spiral” as lenders in repo markets demand larger discounts to lend against 
collateral. In the recent crisis, the combination of falling asset prices and large haircuts created a 
downward spiral that threatened systemic stability.  
The principal lessons from the crisis are clear. One, in order to manage systemic risk, we must 
regulate all institutions deemed systemic, whether they are conventional banks, investment banks 
or shadow banks. Two, microprudential regulation of individual institutions does not per se 
guarantee systemic safety, and additional tools must be employed for macroprudential regulation. 
Three, when a crisis sets in, some form of liquidity provision facility is essential to guard against a 
sudden loss of investor confidence. Finally, large, complex, systemically-important financial 
institutions should have relatively transparent resolution mechanisms in place. Let us consider the 
structure and content of regulation proposed by the Coalition government against this background. 
 
2. The Independent Commission on Banking 
As the crisis revealed many UK banks to be quite fragile, the new government established an 
Independent Commission on Banking in 2010 to explore structural reforms of the UK banking sector 
to promote its systemic stability. It sought to assess UK banks’ traditional model of ‘universal 
banking’ -- that combines both retail and investment banking. It also examined the relatively 
concentrated structure that had emerged, with a handful of large banks dominating the industry. 
The Commission’s report, released in 2011, put forward a proposal to limit the interaction between 
the retail and investment banking functions in UK banks. It called for the assets and liabilities of the 
retail and investment banking functions to be separated, and the retail arm to be ‘ring fenced’. The 
retail arm must carry capital in excess of Basel III regulatory requirements, and only capital above 
this enhanced level can be transferred to the investment banking part. The purpose of this 
restriction is to limit the risk that an investment arm that runs into trouble might drain capital from 
the retail operation. The Coalition government agreed to implement this proposal, but under 
pressure from the City, decided that the restriction would be imposed only after 2019. 
In our opinion, the ring-fencing policy addresses the wrong problem. The crisis arose not within the 
traditional banking sector, but largely from the shadow banking sector. Unlike banks that had some 
depositor protection, this sector was particularly vulnerable to runs once doubts emerged about 
certain classes of securities. Ring-fencing, had it been in place, could hardly have prevented such 
runs in repo markets. More generally, systemic stability requires that all systemically important 
financial institutions should be subject to macroprudential capital requirements. Subjecting only 
banks, or only retail parts of banks, to capital restrictions simply creates distortions without much 
gain in systemic stability.  Indeed such ring-fencing can even increase systemic risk. If the investment 
banking part is in trouble, a universal bank may have an incentive to shrink its retail balance sheet so 
that excess capital can be released to support its investment banking arm. Such asset sales can 
trigger fire-sale externalities.  
Further, the ring-fencing proposal seems to implicitly assume that the main problem in a crisis is that 
of solvency. In the recent crisis many financial intermediaries who required central bank support 
were solvent but illiquid. A ring-fence would, once again, have made this problem worse. The 
liquidity from depositor funds is typically unaffected in a crisis because such funds are backed by 
depositor insurance (which, when designed properly, eliminates depositor runs). If the crisis is 
primarily one of liquidity, access to depositor funds can help investment banking activities in a crisis. 
Overall, in our opinion, the implementation of the ring-fencing proposal would be a step in the 
wrong direction. 
 
3. A new structure for prudential regulation 
In the tripartite regulatory structure created by the Labour government, the Bank of England, the 
Treasury and the Financial Services Authority (FSA) were collectively responsible for financial 
regulation. This arrangement had transferred microprudential regulation of banks, and also 
regulation of their conduct, to the FSA, while financial stability and lender-of-last resort functions 
remained a responsibility of the Bank of England. This tripartite structure was seriously tested by the 
crisis: with insufficient communication between the various parties as events unfolded, and poorly 
assigned responsibilities, this arrangement was found to have a ‘regulatory underlap’.  
The Coalition government remedied this by reforming the institutional structure of financial 
regulation, specifically to improve macroprudential oversight. A new Financial Services Act 2012, 
which came into force in April 2013, abolished the FSA and divided its tasks across different bodies. 
Conduct regulation was transferred to a new body, called the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). A 
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) was set up under the Bank of England to return 
microprudential regulation to the Bank of England, while a Financial Policy Committee (FPC) was 
established in the Bank to maintain systemic oversight. The FPC is tasked with monitoring overall 
levels of leverage and credit growth in the financial system and makes policy recommendations to 
the PRA and FCA as well as to the Treasury.  Along with the existing Monetary Policy Committee, the 
FPC and PRA together puts the Bank of England in charge of monetary policy, prudential bank 
solvency as well as systemic financial stability, making it one of the most powerful central banks in 
the world.  
The new arrangement enables better macroprudential oversight and, as such, is a move in the right 
direction. However, the arrangements fall short when it comes to regulating shadow banks. In the 
US, the Dodd-Frank act of 2010 includes a number of measures to achieve precisely such control. 
The lack of any comparable attempt at gaining control over the shadow sector remains a significant 
weakness of the current UK regime.  
 
4. Regulation of conduct and practice  
The Financial Services Act 2012 hived off the regulation of financial services to a new Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA). Consumer protection is its key remit, but the FCA is also responsible for 
some broader regulatory functions, notably preventing market abuse (such as insider dealing or 
market manipulation) and for promoting competition and innovation. Its mandate covers all firms 
providing retail or wholesale financial services (for instance, banks, building societies, insurance 
companies); its enforcement powers come from its ability to exclude individuals and firms from 
financial markets, to investigate financial crime and to seek criminal penalties through the legal 
system. 
Pre-crisis conduct regulation in the UK had been celebrated as ‘light touch’. Given the extent of 
corporate excess and malfeasance revealed in the wake of the financial crisis, some regulatory 
tightening was inevitable. Indeed regulatory tightening had commenced while the FSA was still in 
charge, and the FCA has largely continued that task using institutional assets and personnel it 
inherited from the FSA. In recent years, the FCA has led the investigations into the manipulation of 
LIBOR and foreign exchange markets by UK banks. The value of financial penalties has risen from 
about £34 million in 2009-10 to £425 million in 2013-14, and the FCA has also resorted to issuing 
public warning notices as a deterrent. 
But the choice of regulatory intensity presents a familiar dilemma for the Coalition. The financial 
services industry continues to be a very substantial part of the UK economy and continues to lobby 
against ‘excessive regulation’ that might damage London’s position as a leading global financial 
centre. But stronger enforcement may be critical for restoring public trust in financial institutions 
tainted by scandals. The on-going debate over excessive personal remuneration in the financial 
sector offers a case in point: despite the public hostility to a culture of large bonuses, the UK 
government has lobbied aggressively against EU attempts to restrain high performance-related pay 
in banks, and even sought legal challenges against European directives that aim to do so. Given the 
Coalition’s reflexive preference for laissez faire policy wherever feasible, there is the risk that choice 
of regulatory intensity may be distorted by ideological considerations.    
 
5. Private debt restructuring 
Recent research has thrown light on the importance of private-sector debt, especially housing debt, 
in determining the severity of crises as well as the duration of the recessions that follow.  Jorda et al. 
(2014), drawing on data from banks’ balance sheets for 17 advanced economies since 1870, show 
that mortgage lending by banks has been the driving force behind the rise of the financial sector. 
Mortgage credit accounts for the bulk of the episodes of credit expansion and these episodes tend 
to be followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries. This research programme puts housing 
finance at the centre of the economy, with significant responsibility for financial instability.  
A related research programme by Mian and Sufi has examined disaggregated data on credit and 
spending from the US. Using a rich variety of sources, they establish that, after the collapse of the 
housing bubble destroyed the net worth of indebted individuals, the withdrawal of their private 
demand, more than any credit crunch, has prolonged the recent recession. If so, restructuring of 
housing debt must form a crucial element of any financial policy reform to enable faster recovery. 
The ‘Help to Buy’ programme in the UK, which involves provision of public equity to support 
investment in housing (the government puts up 20% of the purchase price thus absorbing 20% of 
any subsequent capital gains or losses), is a step in this direction.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Financial regulation is not easy. Regulated entities tend to devote far more resources to avoiding any 
regulatory burden than those available to the regulator in enforcing regulation. This reduces the 
information content of the measures that the regulator depends on. Further, regulation gives rise to 
a boundary problem: regulated entities have the incentive to try to locate economic activity just 
outside the purview of the regulatory authorities, as evident from the rise of shadow banking. It 
follows that any regulatory regime is bound to be imperfect and future crises cannot be ruled out. 
Casting the regulatory net as widely as possible to contain systemic risk, and planning for a soft 
landing should therefore form crucial parts of any regime of financial regulation.  
Since 2010, the Coalition government has improved the regulatory architecture o better manage 
systemic risk, but the lack of any progress towards regulating shadow activities remains a significant 
weakness in the UK regime. The ICB proposal adds little in this regard. As for containing future crises, 
there remains the crucial task of designing transparent resolution mechanisms for large financial 
intermediaries, so that debt holders are prevented from free-riding on the public purse. A debt-
restructuring regime for distressed mortgage holders would help in the event of any collapse in real 
estate prices. However, very little progress has been made on either front so far.  
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